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I. INTRODUCTION
The sentencing laws in America have changed substantially over
the last decade. Sentencing guidelines, mandatory minimum sen-
tences, and "three-strikes-and-you're-out" laws were enacted to
provide tough, uniform, fair, and economically efficient punishment
for criminals in America regardless of race, ethnicity, class, or gen-
der.' Such determinate sentencing laws gained support from both
liberals and conservatives.2 Though these facially neutral and gener-
ally applicable laws have been beneficial in some areas, they have also
adversely affected minority communities, the poor, and women.
Lawmakers are aware of the impact, but have chosen not to act to
eliminate the disparities.4 Ironically, in seeking equality through
gender neutral laws, women have been subjected to more unequal
treatment than ever before.5 Moreover, these laws also fail to achieve
the additional goal of deterrence by an economically efficient
means.6 This Note attempts to analyze the effect of current determi-
nate sentencing laws on women at the federal and state levels. Part II
provides a look at current policy and how the sentencing laws have
been enacted. Part III outlines the rationales supporting and oppos-
ing prevailing determinate sentencing policies. The arguments that
Part III addresses include deterrence, uniform punishment, and eco-
nomic efficiency. Particular attention is paid to the impact of these
laws on African-American women and women in general. Part IV
proposes alternatives to the reforms, such as expanding considera-
tions used in sentencing, allowingjudges to utilize punishments other
than incarceration, and rehabilitative programs for offenders. To
narrow the analysis of this broad and complex topic, this Note focuses
on the federal and California sentencing schemes.
1. SeeinfraPartIl.
2. See infra Part II.A.2.
3. See infra Part III.B.2.
4. See, eg., David G. Savage, Bias Issue in L.A. Drug Cases Goes to Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 1996, at Al (citing that the Clinton administration and the Republican-controlled
Congress are trying to block any changes in crack cocaine prosecutions and maintain the
100-to-1 disparity between crack and powder trafficking sentences in federal court). Lawmakers
may be apprehensive about eliminating the disparities. See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-
RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENTS IN AMERICA 179-80 (1995) (discussing how no powerful con-
stituency will be affronted by increasing sentences, and that the general public understandably
fears crime and resents criminals).
5. See infra Part III.B.2.b-c.
6. See infra Part III.B.3.b.
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II. A LOOKAT THE CURRENT SENTENCING POLICIES
For many years, liberal and conservative commentators wanted to
see a change in American sentencing policies.7 In addition, the pub-
lic wanted the courts to increase the punishment of criminals.8
Lawmakers at the federal and state level responded by passing the
sentencing guidelines, mandatory minimums, and most recently,
"Three Strikes" legislation.9 This response by federal and state law-
makers has increased the sentences of many crimes," while trying to
address the inequalities in the sentencing system.
A. Federal: the Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums
In 1984, the United States Sentencing Commission ("Commis-
sion") was created to draft sentencing guidelines ("Guidelines") for a
comprehensive sentencing scheme." The Commission is an inde-
pendent agency of the judicial branch with members appointed by
the President and confirmed by Congress.'2 The Commission drafted
guidelines that have applied to all federal prosecutions of crimes
committed after November 1, 1987.' The Guidelines provide a sen-
tencing range calculated by considering the criminal conduct for
which the offender has been convicted and the criminal history of
the offender.14 Further, the Guidelines include criteria that allow the
sentencing range to be enhanced or reduced in certain circum-
stances.
15
Federal sentencing laws also contain mandatory minimums and
"Three Strikes" enhancements. Federal legislation virtually elimi-
nates judges' discretion in imposing a sentence below the minimum
required by the statute, 6 hence the expression mandatory minimum.
7. See infra Part IIIA2.
8. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 1991, at 203 (TimothyJ. Flanagan & Kathleen Maguire eds., 1992) [herein-
after SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1991] (quoting a Gallup public opinion
survey which found that 83% of Americans felt that courts did not deal harshly enough with
criminals, while only 3% thought courts were too harsh).
9. "Three Strikes" is a popular term used to describe legislation that requires life impris-
onment upon a criminal's third felony conviction. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (1994); CAL
PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (a) (2) (A) (West 1995).
10. TONRY, supra note 4, at 174 (discussing that between 1975 and 1989, the average time
served per crime in prisons tripled).
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994).
12. Id. § 991(a).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994).
14. Id. § 994 (c)-(d).
15. Id. § 994(s)-(u); seediscussion infraPart III.B.2.a.
16. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994).
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As with the Guidelines, mandatory minimums include criteria that al-
low the sentence range to be enhanced or reduced in certain
circumstances.17 "Three Strikes" enhancements exist because of fed-
eral legislation as well.' Under "Three Strikes" enhancements, a
federal prosecutor may seek mandatory life imprisonment in charg-
ing a defendant with a third "serious violent felony" when the
defendant meets certain criteria. 9
B. State: Mandatory Minimums and "Three Strikes"
States have also reformed sentencing schemes in recent years. In
most states, the legislature determines the sentencing structure, but
in some states voter-approved initiatives have restructured sentencing
laws. 2' Two important modifications have taken place at the state
level. First, nearly all states passed determinate sentencing schemes,
similar to the federal sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum
215laws.2 Second, many states have passed' or have begun to pass"
"Three Strikes" legislation. The enactment of "Three Strikes" laws by
state legislatures or by voter-approved initiatives is an effort to pre-
vent the commission of "serious felonies."
24
17. See discussion infra Part Im.B.2.a.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (1994).
19. Id. § 3559(c) (1) (A) (stating that where: (1) the instant offense is a serious violent fel-
ony and (2) there are two or more prior convictions for serious violent felonies or one prior
serious violent felony and one prior serious drug offense, a prosecutor may seek mandatory life
imprisonment); "serious violent felonies" include: murder, sex crimes, kidnapping, extortion,
arson, firearms use, attempts/conspiracies thereof, or any other offense punishable over ten
years with a force element or which by its nature involves substantial risk of physical force being
used. Id § 3559(c) (2) (F); "serious drug offenses" are defined as anything punishable under 21
U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (1996). 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (1) (H) (1994). For example, knowingly or
intentionally distributing, manufacturing, dispensing or possessing 1K of heroin, 5K of cocaine,
50g of crack cocaine, 100g of phencyclidine (PCP), 10g of lysergic acid diesthylamide (LSD),
400g of N-phenyl-N-propariamide, 1000g of marihuana, or 100g of methamphetamine is con-
sidered a "serious drug offense." 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1) (A) (1994).
20. Donna Hunzeker, Three Strikes Legislation, 2 NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATORS
LEGISBRIEF 31 (Aug. 1994); see also CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION 36-37
(1994) (announcing California's "Three Strikes" initiative).
21. Hunzeker, supra note 20, at 31; see; eg., MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N,
SUMMARYOF 1990 SENTENCING PRACTICES FOR CONviCTED FELONS (1992).
22. Hunzeker, supra note 20, at 31 (citing that California, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana,
Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin had passed "Three
Strikes" or similar legislation).
23. Hunzeker, supra note 20, at 31 (noting that approximately half of the states in the
United States have introduced "Three Strikes" or similar legislation).
24. For example, in California, serious [or violent] felonies include: (1) Murder or volun-
tary manslaughter;, (2) mayhem; (3) rape; (4) sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or
threat of great bodily injury, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or
another person; (5) oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate
and unlawful bodily injury; (6) lewd acts on a child under 14; (7) any felony punishable by
death or life imprisonment in the state prison; (8) any felony in which the defendant inflicts
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M. RATIONALES SUPPORTING AND OPPOSING THE REFORMS
A. Benefits of Current Sentencing Laws
1. Deterrence
Due to the perception that changes in sentencing laws were
needed at the federal and state level to prevent serious felonies, law-
makers enacted current reforms.2s Some proponents of the reforms
argued that continuing serious felonies were a result of the judicial
system's "revolving door" policies that allowed criminals to be re-
leased back into communities to commit more crimes.6 Prior to the
reforms, judges had the discretion to dismiss a sentence enhance-
ment in "furtherance of justice" on his or her own motion, and
impose whatever sentence the judge found necessary given the facts
and law.27 Under the current laws, discretion has been taken from
"soft on crime" judges. Judges may now only dismiss a sentence en-
hancement or depart from the determinate sentence upon motion of
the prosecutor or in a few narrow circumstances.29 This reduction of
great bodily injury or uses a firearm; (9) attempted murder, (10) assault with intent to commit
rape or robbery; (11) assault with a deadly weapon or instrument on a peace officer, (12) as-
sault by a life prisoner on a non-inmate; (13) assault with a deadly weapon by an inmate; (14)
arson; (15) exploding a destructive device or any explosive with intent to injure; (16) exploding
a destructive device or any explosive causing great bodily injury; (17) exploding a destructive
device or any explosive with intent to murder, (18) burglary of an inhabited dwelling house, or
trailer coach, or inhabited portion of any other building;, (19) robbery or bank robbery;, (20)
kidnapping;, (21) holding of a hostage by a person confined in state prison; (22) attempt to
commit a felony punishable by death or life imprisonment; (23) any felony where the defen-
dant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon; (24) selling, furnishing, administering,
giving, or offering to sell, furnish, administer, or give heroin, cocaine, PCP, a methamphet-
amine-related drug, or a precursor of methamphetamine to a minor, (25) any penetration with
a foreign object, under California Penal Code § 289(a), accomplished against the victim's will
by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the vic-
tim or another person; (26) grand theft involving a firearm; (27) carjacking; and (28) any
attempt to commit one or more of the crimes enumerated in this section. CAL PENAL CODE §§
667(a) (4), 667.5(c), 1192.7(c) (West 1995); see, eg. TONRY, supra note 4, at 179-80; see alsojames
Austin, Policy Consideration: "Three Strikes and You're Out": The Likely Consequences on the Courts,
Prisons, and Cime in Caifornia and Washington State, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 239, 241-42
(1994) (arguing that reduction may follow based upon deterrent and/or incapacitation ef-
fects).
25. Austin, supra note 24, at 241-42.
26. See generaly JOAN PETERSILTA & MARVIN LAVIN, TARGETING CAREER CRIMINALS: A
DEVELOPING CRIMINALJUSTICE STRATEGY 1 (1978).
27. TerryJ. HatterJr., Drugs and the Law: "War Games , 29 LOY. LA. L. REV. 89, 90 (1995)
(arguing that discretion which allowed prior offenses to be dismissed has been taken from fed-
eral judges and given to prosecutors); People v. Thomas, 841 P.2d 159, 162 (Cal. 1992)
(allowing judges to dismiss prior offenses in the furtherance ofjustice according to California
Penal Code § 1385 (a)).
28. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 4K1 [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]; see also CAL.
PENAL CODE § 667(f) (2) (West 1995). However, the Supreme Court of California recently held
that the "Three Strikes" laws did not withdraw the statutory power for a court to dismiss a prior
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judicial discretion in sentencing has helped eliminate the "revolving
door" and possibly decreased recidivism.0
The current sentencing laws also limit early release of criminals
and allow for "truth in sentencing. 3 1  Prosecutors may now put
criminals in prison and keep them there to do the time for the crime
committed. No longer can a criminal receive a sentence of twenty
years and serve only five years because of good behavior or proba-
tion.3 Recidivists are specifically deterred from future criminal acts
by knowing the punishment they have already faced and the harsh
punishment that awaits should they be convicted again."3 The gen-
eral population is deterred by having knowledge of the punishment
that current laws could impose.34 Thus, it is not a stretch for propo-
nents of the sentencing reforms to conclude that the reforms have
led to decreases or reduced increases in the levels of crime nation-
wide, both at the federal and state levels."5
felony conviction. People v. Superior Court of San Diego, 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996). Other
states still follow California's original lead by not allowing judges discretion to dismiss prior
felonies. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.120(4) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997) (requiring
that persons who are convicted as a "Three Strike" offender must receive a sentence of life
without the possibility of parole). Further, judges in California" retain some discretion when
determining whether the criminal's conduct amounts to a felony or misdemeanor. When a
crime may be charged as a felony or misdemeanor it is referred to as a "wobbler." See Harold G.
Friedman & David H. Rose, Felony Sentencing in CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW PROCEDURE AND
PRACTICE § 37.5 (Anne Harris &Alys Briggs eds., 2d ed. 1994).
29. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)-(b) (1994) (discussing factors to consider when imposing
sentences and possible justifications for departures from the federal guidelines); In re Foss, 519
P.2d 1073, 1084 (Cal. 1974) (stating that mandatory minimums that shock the conscience and
offend fundamental notions of human dignity are too harsh); cf People v. Jackson, 121 Cal.
App. 3d 862, 869 (1981) (stating the trial court must comply with the statutory mandated sen-
tence and the trial court has no discretion to make its own ad hoc adjustment to fit what it
perceives as equity and justice because the "Legislature has the sole authority to determine the
appropriate punishment for criminal behavior.").
30. See, e.g-., PETERW. GREENWOOD, ALLAN ABRAMSE,JONATHAN CAULKINS, STEPHEN KLEIN,
C. PETER RELL, JAMES CHIESA & KARYN E. MODEL, RAND CORP., THREE STRIKEs AND YOU'RE
OUT: ESTIMATED BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CALIFORNIA'S NEV MANDATORY SENTENCING LAW 18
(1994) [hereinafter RAND STUDY] (finding that "Three Strikes" will reduce the annual number
of serious crimes in California by 28% over the next 25 years).
31. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c) (5) (West 1995) (requiring that eighty percent of an
offender's sentence must be served); 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1994) (stating only 54 days a year
may be earned for good behavior).
32. Id.
33. SeeAustin, supra note 24, at 241-42.
34. SeeAustin, supra note 24, at 241-42 (noting that "mandatory minimum sentencing pro-
visions are frequently presented to the public as crime control measures.").
35. RonaldJ. Ostrow, Murder in U.S. Drops 2% inFrst Half of '95; Crime: Drop in FBIFsgures Is
Sharpest Since 1960, LA. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1995, at A3 (citing FBI crime statistics that show drops
in crime nationwide as follows: violent crime reported to the nation's law enforcement agencies
during the first half of this year dropped 5% from the first half of 1994, while property crime
showed no change which added up to a 1% decrease in overall serious crime); Carl Ingram,
Serious Crime Falls in State's Major Cities, LA TIMES, Mar. 13,1996, atA3 (citing drops in crime in
California). Proponents argue that prior to enactment of the reforms, crime was increasing
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2. Uniform Punishment System
Liberals and conservatives acknowledge that the problem of race,
class, and gender discrimination in sentencing existed for many
years. In an effort to cure the social ills of such discrimination, the
current reforms were initiated. Liberals supported sentencing
changes because they believed that discrimination "in the criminal
justice system was epidemic, that judges, parole boards, and correc-
tions officials could not be trusted, and that tight controls on
officials' discretion offered the only way to limit [the] ... dispari-
ties. ' 6 Conservatives supported reform because they believed that it
was necessary to achieve "greater certainty in sentencing and less
coddling of criminals by liberal judges and parole boards."0
7
Advocates of sentencing changes contend that the reforms have led
to equal punishment of criminals regardless of race, class, or gender.
Criminals are sentenced under laws that do not allow for bias because
the laws mandate sentences that treat each offender equally based on
the crime, not the offender. Furthermore, the discretion judges once
possessed to impose non-uniform sentences has been virtually elimi-
nated. For example, classifications that favored wealthy majority
individuals like education, employment history, and family obliga-
tions have practically been invalidated as acceptable sentencing
considerations.m These changes in sentencing have helped to elimi-
nate some of the problems of discrimination and sentencing
uncertainty.
3. Economic Efficiency
Changes in sentencing laws need to strive for social benefits while
maintaining economic efficiency. Studies have indicated that the
benefits of current laws outweigh the costs of operating the prison
and refer to studies showing increases in some violent crimes. See CRIME STATE RANKINGS 1994:
CRIME IN THE 50 UNrrED STATES 285-86, 419-20 (Kathleen O'Leary Morgan et al. eds., 1994)
(reporting statistics calculated by the Morgan Quimo Corporation using data from the U.S. De-
partment of Justice, showing a 14.92% increase in the number of murders, including non-
negligent manslaughter, from 1988 to 1992).
36. ToNRY, supra note 4, at 164.
37. TONRY, supra note 4, at 165.
38. TONRY, supra note 4, at 167-70 (referring to arguments made to keep factors such as
education, employment, and family obligations from being considered at sentencing because of
possible class bias); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (1994) (stating "the general inappropriateness of
considering the education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilities,
and community ties of the defendant"); U.S.S.G., supra note 28, §§ 5H1.2 (a policy statement
declaring education and vocation skills ordinarily irrelevant as a sentencing consideration) and
5H1.6 (a policy statement declaring family ties ordinarily irrelevant as a sentencing considera-
tion).
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system under the reforms."' These studies rely on evidence revealing
that targeted deterrence and incapacitation, caused by the heavy sen-
tences imposed by reforms, will lead to a decrease in crime." This
reliance is not entirely unfounded since, as discussed earlier, such de-
terrence may have led to decreases or reduced increases in the levels
of crime nationwide at federal and state levels." The studies state
that over time, when factors such as property loss, pain and suffering,
lost wages, police, security, medical, and insurance costs are weighed
against prison costs, the current determinate sentencing laws will save
resources.4 Thus, if the sentencing laws punish the criminals who are
committing a vast majority of the crimes more harshly than the first-
time offender, society pays a lower costi5
B. Criticisms of Current Sentencing Laws
Opponents of the current sentencing reforms argue that deter-
rence and uniform punishment have yet to be achieved, or are
achieved at a moral and economic cost that is too high.4 This view is
supported by anecdotal evidence and statistical studies that show de-
terrence may actually be prevented by these laws." Further, evidence
of a disparate impact indicates that confusing definitions, discretion,
39. See, e.g., PHILIP J. ROMERO, CALiFoRNiA GovERNOR's OFFICE OF PLANNING AND
RESEARCH, How INCARCERATING MORE FELONS WILL BENEFrr CALIFORNIA'S ECONOMY (1994)
(citing that operating costs for the prison system would eventually increase by $6.3 billion by
the year 2028, but the social benefits would reach $54.5 billion during that same period);Jona-
than Marshall, Balancing the Three Strike Equation, CAL. LAw., Feb. 15, 1995, at 56, 58-59
(factoring estimates ofjury verdict values by Mark Cohen into Rand's crime estimates and con-
cluding that every $5 million in spending on "three strikes" will save more than $6.2 million in
victim costs, not including the cost of arson); PETER W. GREEmvOOD & ALLAN ABRAHAMSE, THE
RAND CORP. PREPARED FOR THE NAT'L INSTrrUTE FORJUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SELECTIE
INCAPACITATION xiii (1982) (discussing the Executive Summary ) (estimating that the rate of
crime and/or the prison population would decrease by selectively incarcerating "high rate" of-
fenders); DETERRENCE AND INCAPACrTATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECFS OF CRIMINAL SANGTIONS
ON CRIME RATES 64 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978) [hereinafter "Deterrence and Incapaci-
tation"] (arguing that incapacitation removes offenders from society, thus reducing crime by
physically preventing offenders from committing more crimes); RONALD J. PESTRrrfO, IN
DEFENSE OF THREE STRIKES: ANALYzING THE IMPACT OF CALIFORNIA'S 1994 ANTI-CRIME
MEASURES 9-14 (1996) (stating "[i]ncapadtation involves removing an offender from general
society and thereby reducing crime by physically preventing the offender from committing
crimes in that society.").
40. See DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATON, supra note 39, at 75-76.
41. See Hatter, supra note 27, at 94 (arguing that juvenile crime rates are on the rise and
that Congress has failed to focus on juveniles) .
42. See PESrRITrO, supra note 39, at 9-14.
43. MARK MAUER AND MALCOLM C. YOUNG, TRUTH, HALF-TRUTHs AND LIES: MyrHs AND
REALrTIES ABOUT CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 3-4 (1996) (citing a study by Edwin Zedlewski that
found the cost of incarcerating an offender was offset by the reduced crime costs for each of-
fender locked up).
44. Id. at 1-2.
45. I& at 2.
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and biases continue the discrepancies that existed before the re-
forms.4 6 In some instances, the biases in existence before the reforms
have become significantly worse.
1. Deterrence May Not Be Achieved
a. The Proportionality Problem
The current sentencing laws may frustrate the goal of achieving
proportionality of punishment to the crime. To achieve the maxi-
mum amount of deterrence, "[tihe maximum penalty for someone
who has been a persistent criminal cannot be greater than that war-
ranted by the seriousness of the offense for which he is being
sentenced."" Any other sentence will appear arbitrary and will not
achieve the maximum amount of possible deterrence. Thus, rape
and murder are punished quite severely, while petty theft is punished
less.- However, under reformed sentencing laws, the punishment
level gap that existed between crimes such as murder and petty theft
is being narrowed because of the increase in sentences.-" Further,
under "Three Strikes," the same sentence could be imposed whether
the felony is violent or nonviolent. 2 For example, if a criminal with
two strikes decides to commit a felony, no deterrent exists to prevent
the criminal from choosing to perform a violent felony versus a non-
violent felony. Yet, many people would argue that a violent felony
46. MARC MAUER AND TRAcY HULING, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINALJUSTICE
Sysri: FIVE YEARS LATER 11 (1995) (arguing that racial targeting and incarceration rates for
young black men directly relates to biased law enforcement practices).
47. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.a-c.
48. DANIEL GLASER, SUPERVISING OFFENDERS OUTSIDE PRISON 208-12 (1983).
49. See Mark W. Owens, Cahfornia's Three Strikes Law: Desperate Times Require Desperate Meas-
ures-But WiU It Work?, 26 PAC. LJ. 881, 905 (1995) (describing how lower state courts have
held grossly excessive statutory penalties in relation to the crime committed as violating the
Eighth Amendment).
50. See id. (noting that judges will sentence a criminal often in accordance with the crime's
severity).
51. See id. at 902 (stating that "Three Strikes" laws follow the principle of "collective inca-
pacitation," meaning all second and third time convicted criminals of certain offenses receive
the exact enhancement in sentences).
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (1994) (differentiating between violent felonies and nonviolent
felonies such as "serious drug offenses" when sentencing a prisoner to life imprisonment); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 667(d) (West 1995) (stating the definition of a prior felony conviction under the
"three strikes" law). See also PHILLIP G. ZIMBARDO, CENTER ONJUVENILE AND CRIMINALJUSTICE,
TRANSFORMING CALIFORNIA'S PRISONS INTO EXPENSIVE OLD AGE HOMES FOR FELONS 5 (1994).
53. See, e.g., John Johnson & Beth Shuster, Police Shootings Raise Questions About "3 Strikes,"
LA TIMES, Mar. 13, 1996, at Al (citing statements by Los Angeles Police Department ChiefVWl-
lie L. Williams that the "three strikes" law may force lawbreakers to resist arrest out of
desperation); PeterJ. Benekos & Alida V. Merlo, Three Strikes and You're Out!: The Political Sen-
tencing Game, FED. PROBATION 3, 6 (Mar. 1995) (reflecting on beliefs of police officers that
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should receive a higher deterrent, or a higher punishment, than a
nonviolent felony.!"
Another example of the problem in achieving proportionality is
the "crack cocaine" prosecutions under the reforms."5 Retail-level
crack cocaine dealers are punished the same as, if not worse than
wholesale and import-level powder cocaine dealers.56 Moreover, sen-
tences for crack cocaine offenses may lead to punishments that are
nearly three times the average prison sentence served by a murderer,
four times the prison sentence for most kidnappers, five times the
prison sentence imposed on rapists, and ten times the prison sen-
tence required for those who illegally possess guns. If it is believed
that retail-level crack cocaine dealing is a more despicable crime than
importing powder cocaine or committing rape, then the harsh sen-
tences may seem appropriate. Many, however, disagree and argue
that importers of powder cocaine or rapists should receive sentences
greater than retail-level crack dealers- The Sentencing Commission
advised Congress in April of 1995 to reassess the penalty guidelines
for crack cocaine offenses, in order to reconcile the mandatory stat-
utes with the sentencing guidelines. 9  In both examples,
proportionality of punishment is lost6a Accordingly, deterrence of
the most serious crimes may be prevented by the reforms.5 ' Neverthe-
offenders facing their third conviction under a "three strikes" system are more likely to commit
violent acts); Timothy Egan, A 3-Strike Law Shows It's Not As Simple As It Seems, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
15, 1994, at Al (noting that police officers have encountered a "nothing to lose" attitude in
suspects who face a potential third conviction).
54. Molly Selvin, Preserving a Sense ofJustice in a "Three Strikes"Environment, LA. TIMES, Mar.
17, 1996, at 3 (indicating that the District Attorney of San Francisco, Terrance Hallinan, will
.no longer prosecute nonviolent offenders under the 'three strikes' law").
55. SeeMAUER& YOUNG, supra note 43, at 11 (arguing that the disparity between sentences
for crack cocaine and powder cocaine is based on who uses each particular drug).
56. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT To THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM 66-67, 75 (1991) [hereinafter MANDATORY
MINIMUM PENALTIES] (citing that a higher percentage of street level distributors receive the
mandatory minimum approximately 70% of the time, while importers receive the mandatory
minimum approximately 60% of the time).
57. Richard Leiby, A Crack in the System; This Small-Time Dealer is Doing 20 Years. He Might Be
Better Off if He'd Killed Somebody, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1994, at Fl, F4 (reporting the story of a
crack cocaine defendant, with no prior criminal record, who was convicted for crack cocaine
distribution and sentenced to nineteen years in prison without the possibility of parole).
58. SeeInterview with the Honorable TerryJ. Hatter, Jr., United States District CourtJudge
for the Central District of California, in Los Angeles, CA (Oct. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Hatter
Interview] (on file with the author).
59. See Karen Lugen, Culpability and Sentencing Under Mandatory Minimums and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: The Punishment No Longer Fits the Cimina4 10 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 389, 439 (1996).
60. See id. (noting that mandatory minimums are often a product of "extreme impulses of
society").
61. See generally id. at 441.
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less, the recommendations of the Sentencing Commission were re-
jected for the first time in history.
b. The Nullication Problem
Besides the proportionality problem, another problem preventing
deterrence is the unlikelihood of conviction because of the imposi-
tion of harsh determinate sentencing.62 In some cases, the victim
refuses to aid in the prosecution of a defendant because the victim is
aware of the punishment the defendant might incur if convicted.6
Moreover, judges and prosecutors have attempted to avoid imposi-
tion of unnecessarily harsh punishments.6 Some modem judges
have allowed defendants to argue the injustice of federal minimum
sentences to the jury, possibly as a protest against harsh sentencing
guidelines.65 Further, juries have also nullified by adhering to their
reluctance to impose the harsh sentences imposed by determinate
sentencing.&
c. Lingering Discretion Hinders Deterrence
Moreover, the reforms may not achieve the deterrence sought be-
cause of lingering discretion. Prior to sentencing reforms,
commentators were concerned with a judge's discretion. However
with sentencing reforms, discretion appears to have been transferred
from judges to prosecutors.H Instead of accusations that judges are
62. See, e.g., Victim Refuses to Testify in '3 Strikes' Case, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1994, at A3 (citing
to the California sentencing law signed by Governor Wilson).
63. See U1 (quoting a woman victim that "cried foul" and refused to testify about a crime
that could have sent the defendant to prison for life for automobile theft).
64. Richard Lee Colvin & Ted Rohrlich, Courts Toss Curves at '3 Strikes, LA TIMES, Oct. 23,
1994, at Al (reporting findings of a study conducted six months after "three strikes" law imple-
mented which revealed that only 1 in 6 eligible defendants receives 25 years to life because
Californiajudges and prosecutors have eased sentencing).
65. See United States v. Datcher, 830 F. Supp. 411 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (refusing to allow an
explicit plea for jury nullification, but allowing the jury to have the information necessary for
them to make an informed decision to nullify, should they be so inclined); see also Kristen K.
Sauer, Note, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury About Mandatory Sentencing Consequences, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1232 (1995); cf. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
CriminalJustice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 718 (1995) (suggesting that juries should nullify prose-
cutions of drug offenses because the crimes are victimless and non-violent).
66. See, e.g., Chi Chi Sileo, Are Three-Strikes Laws Handcuffing the Courts?, WASH. TIMES, Mar.
13, 1995, at Al (explaining that one jury deadlocked on a routine burglary charge because it
did not want to sentence the offender to life in prison); Racism, Harsh Sentences Lead to More Jury
Nullification, Suggests Law Prof ,Jan. 26, 1996, available in 1996 WL 258186 (discussing how more
juries are invokingjury nullification to acquit defendants because they believe the criminal jus-
tice system is racist).
67. See supra part I1.A1-2; see also, HAROLD J. VETrER & LEONARD TERRITO, CRIME AND
JUSTICE IN AMECA: A HUMAN PERSPECTIVE 233 (1984).
68. Hatter Interview, supra note 58 (arguing that discretion which allowed prior offenses to
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abusing their discretion, there are now such accusations about prose-
cutors.6 9 Such accusations claim that the race and economic status of
a defendant remain strong factors in establishing the level of pun-
ishment a prosecutor will seek.7' Thus, minorities and the poor will
continue to be punished disproportionately due to the discretion of
prosecutors under sentencing reform measures."
The transfer of discretion, rather than its elimination, may prevent
deterrence from being achieved.72 Since non-minorities and the
wealthy receive a lesser sentence for the same crimes committed than
minorities and the poor, they are less deterred from committing
those offenses. 7 Further, minorities and the poor are less deterred
because of a belief that they are being punished not for their crime
or criminal history, but rather for their group status.74
2. A Uniform Punishment System Has Not Yet Been Achieved
a. Vague Definitions Continue to Generate Discrepancies
Sentencing reform was enacted to develop tough, uniform, and fair
punishment, but instead the reforms preserve areas that allow for dis-
crepancies. Vague definitions in determinate sentencing laws, both
at the federal and state levels, allow for prosecutorial discretion75 and
be dismissed has been taken from federal judges and given to prosecutors);J. Anthony Kline,
Comment, The Politicalization of Cime, 46 HAsINGS LJ. 1087, 1092 n.43 (1995) (discussing that
criminal defendants are arguing that California's sentencing laws are unconstitutional and vio-
late the separation of powers because the laws transfer judicial discretion in sentencing to
prosecutors).
69. SeeVLTrE & TERRrO, supra note 67, at 236 (arguing that the transfer of power of dis-
cretion has created new problems in the criminal justice system).
70. MANDATORYMINMUM PENALTIES, supra note 56, at 81 (stating that whites tend to plead
guilty and receive motions for reductions of sentence for cooperation more frequently than
blacks do); see also id. at 80 (indicating that approximately 67% of black offenders are sentenced
to the mandatory minimum, while approximately 53% of white offenders are sentenced to the
mandatory minimum); see, e.g., Alan Abrahamson, D.A. 's Handling of Case Becomes Campaign Is-
sue, LA. TMES, Feb. 29, 1996, at B1 (stating that Los Angeles County District Attorney Gil
Garcetti may have used his influence to remove a prior strike from a campaign contributor's
grandson, thereby enabling him to receive a 16 month sentence instead of life); Elizabeth T.
Lear, Is Conviction IrrelevanO, 40 UCLA. L. REV. 1179, 1206-07 (1993) (commenting on prosecu-
torial abuses made possible by the relevant conduct provision of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines which state that the guidelines "impose a natural limit upon the prosecutor's ability
to increase a defendant's sentence").
71. JEFmY REim , AND THE POOR GEr PRISON 111 (1996) (stating that poor offenders
cannot afford adequate legal representation and thus are punished more harshly than wealthy
offenders who can afford good legal representation).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 91-92.
74. Id. at 93-94.
75. See Lujen, supra note 59, at 419 (explaining that prosecutors often pursue lesser of-
fenses in plea bargains).
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inconsistent applications of sentencing laws by judges.6 In most of
the determinate sentencing schemes, two criteria are utilized in de-
termining an offender's sentencing range.7 The first set of criterion
considered in sentencing is the nature and circumstances of the of-
fense, and the second criterion is the offender's criminal history.78
However, adjustments in the sentencing range are made according to
various vague criteria.7 Two examples where vague definitions allow
for discrepancies are in determining an offender's sentencing range
without enhancements or departures and in motions for downward
departures for "substantial assistance or cooperation.""0 A closer look
at the federal system will demonstrate the problems of vague terms.81
In the federal system, the first criterion considered in sentencing is
the offender's criminal conduct.2 Adjustments in the defendant's
criminal conduct may allow for discrepancies in sentencing. 3 These
adjustments in conduct include the defendant's acceptance of re-
sponsibility, role in the offense, and obstruction of justice.84 Role in
the offense and obstruction ofjustice are criteria that allow for prose-
cutorial discretion by the government s Although the government
must listen to the defendant, convincing prosecutors of the defen-
dant's role in the offense or the defendant's truthfulness may prove
impossible.s6 Prosecutors are then left the discretion to determine
76. See Lugen, supra note 59, at 411 (explaining Justice Scalia's opinion that judges often
use their subjective values in applying the law).
77. See Lujen, supra note 59, at 426.
78. Sep e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1) (1994); Hunzeker, supra note 20, at 31.
79. See Lugen, supra note 59, at 430-31 (describing various criteria used by a judge when
deciding an offender's sentence).
80. SeeLugen, supra note 59, at 445.
81. To clarify vague terms in the guidelines, the Commission has passed 422 amendments
between 1988 and 1991. 56 Fed. Reg. 22, 762-97 (1991). However, vague terms remain a prob-
lem in the guidelines. See infra Part III.B.2.a.
82. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) (1) (1994).
83. SeeKeith C. Owens, California's "Three Strikes"Debade." A Volatile Mixture of Fear, Vengeance
and Demagoguery Will Unravel The CriminalJustice System and Bring California to its Knees, 25 SW.
U.L. REV. 129, 144 (1995) (explaining why adjustments in a sentence do not reflect the serious-
ness of the crime, nor the intent of the lawmakers).
84. U.S.S.G., supra note 28, §§ 3B1.1 (referring to the aggravating role), and 3B1.2 (refer-
ring to a mitigating role); see also id §§ 3E1.1 (referring to the acceptance of responsibility),
and 31.1 (referring to the obstruction ofjustice).
85. U.S.S.G., supra note 28, §§ 3C1.1 (referring to the obstruction of justice) and 3.B1.1
(referring to the aggravating role).
86. Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717,
748, 755-56 (1996) (showing how prosecutors view prior convictions and how the convictions
influence the decision with what to charge a defendant for the current offense).
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whether these adjustments increase or decrease a criminal's sen-
87
tence.
In federal courts, adjustments for criminal conduct outside the
charged offense are made by factoring conduct that is outside the
charged offense as "relevant conduct."'s Relevant conduct is a vague
term that is difficult to apply consistently in the federal system.89 In
defining "relevant conduct," the guidelines consider whether the of-
fender had 'Jointly undertaken" the criminal activity, and whether
the activity constitutes the "same course of conduct."9 This defini-
tion leaves many judges and attorneys "scratching their heads,"
wondering how to apply such an ambiguous term.9' Such confusing
definitions in determining adjustments based on the offender's in-
stant criminal conduct continue to generate enormous discrepancies
in federal and state sentencing schemes.92
The second criterion considered in the federal sentencing system is
the offender's criminal history.' Criminal history designations such
as "career offender"" and "armed career criminal" boost the sen-
tence range up to, or near, the statutory maximum for the offense.9
Criminal history determinations are less complex than those for con-
duct, but enable discrepancies because of the significant degree of
discretion retained by prosecutors and judges.97  Discrepancies can
87. Id.
88. U.S.S.G., supra note 28, § 1B1.3.
89. &, e.g., United States v. Hahn, 960 F.2d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying "relevant
conduct" increased the defendant's incarceration time six fold which "reveals the tremendous
potential a haphazard application of the 'relevant conduct' provision"); United States v. Sykes, 7
F.3d 1331, 1335 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying "relevant conduct" in calculating the defendant's
bare offense level under the sentencing guidelines).
90. Hahn, 960 F.2d 903 (interpreting "relevant conduct" specifically as the "same course of
conduct").
91. The ambiguity of "relevant conduct" as applied to sentencing considerations leads to
many appeals. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 1994, at 144 (1994) [hereinafter
ANNUAL REPORT 1994] (stating that "relevant conduct" is the second most frequently appealed
issue by defendants and the fourth most frequently appealed issue by the government). The
ambiguity of "relevant conduct" also leads to greater prosecutorial discretion. Lear, supra note
70, at 1206 (commenting on prosecutorial abuses made possible by the relevant conduct provi-
sion of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
92. SeegeneraUy, Gerald W. Heaney, RedsitingDisparity:Debating Guidelines Sentencing, 29 AM.
CiM. L. REV. 771, 772-77 (1992) (arguing that Guidelines are harsh, vague, and effectively
transfer discretion to prosecutors).
93. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1) (1994).
94. U.S.S.G., supra note 28, §§ 4Bl.1 and 4B1.2 (defining career offenders).
95. U.S.S.G., supra note 28, § 4B1A (defining armed career criminals).
96. U.S.S.G., supra note 28, § 4B1.4.
97. Selvin, supra note 54, at M1 (citing discretion by judges and prosecutors that allows for
the disparity in prosecution of "Three Strikes" offenses in different counties of California).
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occur as a result of a prosecutor's motion to dismiss prior offenses"
or a judge's refusal to dismiss prior offenses.9 Vague definitions in
history determinations allow for such discrepancies.&°
Another example of vague definitions allowing for discrepancies is
found in motions for downward departures. When the prosecution
makes a motion for departure, the judge can sentence the defendant
below the determinate sentencing range if a defendant meets the
narrow exceptions allowing for departure from the sentencing guide-
lines.'' These motions are usually made in conjunction with a "plea
bargain ""' agreement.' °3 It should be noted that within a plea bar-
gain there are two different components-a charge-reduction plea
agreement, which is somewhat limited,' °4 and a departure motion,
which is essentially unlimited.'05 With motions for departures, prose-
cutors have the power not only to choose the crime to prosecute, but
to help establish the level of punishment after the conviction."6
98. See supra Part III.B.1.C (citing prosecutorial discretion in dismissing prior offenses).
99. See supra Part 11.B.1-2.
100. See supra Part III.B.1-2.
101. U.S.S.G., supra note 28, § 5Kl.1; FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (permitting reduction of sen-
tence, including reduction below minimum mandatory sentence, for cooperation and
substantial assistance rendered within one year of sentencing); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f) (2)
(West 1995) (allowing prosecutors to move for dismissal of prior felony convictions thereby re-
ducing the defendant's sentence); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385(a) (West 1995) (allowing a
judge or magistrate to dismiss an action on the judges own motion or on the prosecutor's ap-
plication). However, as mentioned earlier, in California, ajudge may dismiss a prior felony in
"Three Strikes" cases. People v. Superior Court of San Diego, 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996) (hold-
ing that three strikes law does not preclude courts from excluding testimony of prior
convictions).
102. The term "plea bargaining" has come to mean the process whereby the accused and
the prosecutor negotiate a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case. BLACK'S LAW
DICaTONARY 1152 (6th ed. 1991).
103. See Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland, A Conversation About Sentencing Commissions
and Guidelines, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 655, 668 (1993) (discussing how plea bargaining has af-
fected sentencing guideline efforts).
104. This difference should be noted because charge-reduction plea bargaining has been
limited. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(a) (West 1995) (stating that "[p] lea bargaining in
any case in which the indictment or information charges any serious felony, any felony in which
it is alleged that a firearm was personally used by the defendant, or any offense of driving while
under the influence of alcohol, drugs, narcotics, or any other intoxicating substance, or any
combination thereof, is prohibited, unless there is insufficient evidence to prove the people's
case, or testimony of a material witness cannot be obtained, or a reduction or dismissal would
not result in a substantial change in sentence"); U.S.S.G. supra note 28, § 6B1.2(a) (requiring
that the plea agreement "adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior").
105. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT 1994, supra note 91, at 82 (discussing the various stated rea-
sons for departure motions).
106. In the federal judiciary, the circuits are split as to whether ajudge may depart below
the level recommended by the prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Chavarria-Herrara, 15 F.3d
1033, 1034 (l1th Cir. 1994) (holding that a district court judge may reduce a sentence below
the required minimum under Rule 35(b) but may not rely on any information other than the
substantial assistance of the defendant); United States v. McAndrews, 12 F.3d 273, 277 (1st Cir.
1993) (holding that the government had no authority to appeal a sentence reduced under FED.
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Again, focusing on the federal system, the discrepancies with regard
to "substantial assistance" departures are apparent.
Federal prosecutors may make motions for downward departures
for many reasons. 7 The most elusive concept in this arena concerns
"substantial assistance."" 8 The meaning of the term "substantial assis-
tance" is open to interpretation and its utilization varies from district
to district!'" The punishment a person may receive varies between
geographical areas, apparently not based on any reason other than
differing prosecutorial policies from area to area."' Vague defini-
tions allow for discretion that continues to generate discrepancies
and prevent uniform punishment."'
b. Adverse Effect on African-American Women
Many commentators in the sentencing debate agree that the
criminal justice system has had a devastating impact on African-
Americans for many years." 2 Reforms that were supposed to lead to
R. CaJm. P. 35 (b)).
107. ANNUAL REPORT 1994, supra note 91, at 82 (citing reasons given for downward depar-
tures other than substantial assistance which include:
pursuant to plea agreement (676), criminal history category over-represents defendant
involvement (431), general mitigating circumstances (372), family ties and responsi-
bilities (213), physical condition (200), offense behavior was an isolated incident
(192), diminished capacity (175), age (76), role in the offense (75), acceptance of re-
sponsibility (75), mental and emotional conditions (70), rehabilitation (51), coercion
and distress (45), to put defendant's sentence in line with codefendant (38), dollar
amount (38), adequate to meet purposes of sentencing (34), no prior record/first of-
fender (32), voluntary disclosure (§5k2.16) (32), restitution (26), convictions on
related counts (22), cooperation motion unknown (22), victim (20), lesser harm (20),
currently receiving punishment under state/federal jurisdiction (18), community ties
(17), deterrence (14), cooperation without motion (13), previous employment record
(12), guidelines too high (11), drug dependence or alcohol abuse (10), military rec-
ord (10), not representative of the heartland (10), other (282)).
108. SeeANNUAL REPORT 1994, supra note 91, app. A.
109. SeeANNUAL REPORT 1994, supra note 91, app. A (citing discrepancies in the federal sys-
tem when looking at substantial assistance departures; for example, in the Central District of
California there are few departures (6.7% or 62), while there are more in the Southern District
of California (22.6% or 396) and nationwide (19.5% or 7,524)).
110. Vague terms within California's determinate sentencing laws allow for varied enforce-
ment from county to county. For example, San Francisco does not prosecute nonviolent
offenses as a third strike, while Los Angeles does prosecute some non-violent offenses as a third
strike. See Selvin, supra note 55, at 5 (citing statements by district attorneys of San Francisco and
Los Angeles discussing how prosecutorial and judicial discretion affects the "three strikes and
you're out" law).
111. See Selvin, supra note 54, at5.
112. See, e.g., Floyd D. Weatherspoon, TheDevastatingImpact of the Justice System on the Status of
African-AmericanMale:An Ovewiew Perspective, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 23 (1994) (citing the historical
and continuing disparities in the criminal justice system of issues such as: selective enforcement,
incarceration of African-American males, racial disparities in sentencing, racial disparities in
prosecutorial decisions, law enforcement and police brutality, racial bias in the death penalty,
and racial bias in thejuvenile system).
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uniform punishment instead continue to permit discretion and sub-
sequent discrimination.113 Unfortunately, the current sentencing laws
have not eliminated or eased problems faced by this minority
group.Y4 The failure to eliminate discretion and bias, increased sen-
tences and the criminalization of certain activities have a particularly
adverse effect on African-Americans."' The changes in sentencing
laws have adversely affected both the African-American male and fe-
male populations, albeit in different ways." 6
In particular, African-American women have apparently been sub-
ject to selective prosecution. 7 The "war on drugs" has greatly
accelerated the incarceration of young women from this minority
group."8 For example, the number of African-American women im-
prisoned in California for drug-related offenses rose from 55 in 1984
to 1,006 in 1994."9 Women of this minority group are now arrested
120
and going to prison in California at rates close to that of white men.
Moreover, 4.8 percent of women from this minority group serve
prison sentences nationwide, while only 1.4 percent of white women
serve sentences. 2' Overall, African-American women make up over
forty percent of women in state prisons.ss Therefore, a white woman
is less likely to serve a prison sentence than an African-American
113. See supra Part IH.B.2.a (discussing vague definitions that continue to generate discrep-
ancies in sentencing).
114. SeeWeatherspoon, supra note 112, at 23 (discussing that from arrest to incarceration or
execution the criminal justice system penalizes African-American males without "conscience,
remorse, or constitutional protection").
115. See Weatherspoon, supra note 112, at 24 (citing studies demonstrating that 48% of all
drug violators are African-Americans, however, that African-Americans are eight times more
likely to be in prison than whites).
116. SeeWeatherspoon, supra note 112, at 24.
117. Greg Krikorian, Study QuestionsJustice System's Raial Faimess, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1996,
at A5 (citing a study by the Center on juvenile and Criminal Justice and the Sentencing Project
which utilized figures from the California Department of Corrections that reveals the war on




120. Id. at Al (citing a study by the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice and the Sen-
tencing Project that indicated about 3% of African-American women in their twenties are under
the control of the state's criminal justice system compared to 5% of white men in the same age
group).
121. Sam Fuhwood, HI, Farrakhan Calls Men Shunning March Tools', LA TIMEs, Oct. 15, 1995,
at Al (citing a study by the Sentencing Project utilizing Bureau of Justice Statistics discussing
the disparity between minority women and white women serving prison sentences).
122. SeeSOURCEBOOK OF CRBIINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1991, supra note 8, at 648 (noting that
in 1986 46.0% of prison inmates were Black, no-Hispanic females). However, African-
Americans only comprise approximately 12% of the United States population. U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENsus, STATiSnCALABSrRAc OFTHE UNrrfED STATEs: 1990, at 215 (114th ed. 1994).
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woman.IH These numbers indicate that African-American females are
punished at a much higher rate than are non-minorities. Two exam-
ples of the continuing bias in the prosecution of African-American
females are federal and state drug prosecutions.'24 These are dis-
cussed in turn below.
Some commentators argue that the federal drug prosecution laws
are the most dear examples of racism in the criminal justice system.IH
Others argue that it is the application of drug laws that is problem-
atic. 6 For example, in United States v. Armstrong,27 federal public
defenders sought to challenge the constitutionality of the selection
process utilized by the United States Attorney in the Central District
of California for prosecution of drug offenses in federal court.'"
However, prosecutors denied defense lawyers access to statistics that
could prove discrimination in the selection process1'2 The Supreme
Court agreed with the prosecutorial policies in the Central District
and denied access to the statistics.!50 Therefore, any appearance of
123. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1991, supra note 8, at 648 (noting
that in 1986 39.6% of prison inmates were White, non-Hispanic females and 46.1% were Black,
non-Hispanic females).
124. SeeSOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTIcE STATISTICS 1991, supra note 8, at 657 (illustrating
that black females had the highest percentage of commitment to federal prisons for drug of-
fenses).
125. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 65, at 695-96 (discussing evidence of racism in the criminal
justice system including past and present administration of death penalty cases, negative racist
imagery of crime, the disparities in punishment and race, and the acquittal of the police offi-
cers who severly beat Rodney King).
126. For example, Richard A. Berk, professor of social policy at the University of California
at Los Angeles, compared charges by different Los Angeles law enforcement agencies for selling
crack and powder cocaine between the years 1988 and 1992. The study concluded that three
African-Americans to one white were charged by state and county officers, and where two and
one-half African-Americans were charged for every one Latino. At the federal courthouse for
Los Angeles, no whites were charged with selling crack, whereas the ratio of African-Americans
to Latinosjumped to four and one-half to one. Mary Pat Flaherty &Joan Biskupic, Rules Often
Impose Toughest Penalties on Poor, Minorities; Justice Dept. Says the System Is Free of Bias, WASH. POST,
Oct. 9, 1996, atAl (discussing racial discrepancies in criminal sentencing).
127. 48 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1995).
128. Federal Public Defenders cited that all twenty-four crack cases handled by its lawyers in
1991 involved an African-American defendant. Id. at 1515; see alsoANNUAL REPORT 1994, supra
note 91, at 107 (citing that 90.4% of those convicted for violation of the crack laws were African-
American); Savage, supra note 4, atAl (stating that "between Jan. 1, 1992, and Mar. 31, 1995,
the U.S. Attorney in the Central District filed 144 indictments in crack-trafficking cases and of
those indicted, 102 were African-American, 29 were Latino, eight were Asian and one was white,
while the other four were fugitives whose race was not recorded").
129. Armstrong; 48 F.3d at 1508.
130. United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1487-89 (1996) (holding that "to establish
entitlement to discovery on claim of selective prosecution based on race, defendant must pro-
duce credible evidence that similarly situated defendants of other races could have been
prosecuted, but were not"); see also United States v. Olvis, 97 F.3d 739, 744 (4th Cir. 1996)
(overturning selective prosecution findings by the district court because the district court failed
to consider several additional factors that play substantial roles in prosecutorial decisions such
as involvement in the crime or the amount of cooperation from the alleged criminal).
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selective federal drug prosecution of African-Americans and other
minority groups will need to be challenged in another fashion.""
Another area demonstrative of the selective prosecution of African-
American women is that of prosecutions aimed at preventing prena-
tal substance abuse. Prenatal substance abuse is a serious problem in
the United States.3 2 Studies estimate that every year 430,000 infants
born in the United States are exposed to drugs in utero.'33 Criminal
prosecutions of pregnant women for substance abuse have occurred
in nineteen states and the District of Columbia.TM Interestingly, while
African-American females do not comprise a majority of substance
abusers,3 they have been targeted for these prosecutions.3 6 Evidence
of selective prosecution demonstrates that the criminal justice system
has yet to achieve a uniform system of punishment.
Current equal protection doctrines require the defendant to prove
purposeful discrimination in order to demonstrate that selective
prosecutions are unconstitutional.' However, it is difficult for a de-
fendant to meet this burden when prosecutors refuse to release
information that may prove purposeful discrimination. As a result of
decisions that fail to recognize discrimination,M minority communi-
131. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1489.
132. Julia Elizabeth Jones, Comment, State Intervention in Pregnancy, 52 LA. L. REV. 1159,
1160 (1992) (discussing how states have attempted to protect unborn children from substance
abuse, and the constitutionality of criminalizing mothers who abuse substances during preg-
nancy).
133. Terry A. Adirim & Nandini S. Gupta, A National Survey of State Maternal and Newborn
Drug Testing and ReportingPolicies, 106 PUB. HEALTH REP. 292, 293 (1991) (analyzing a survey of
all fifty states and the current policies regarding legislating drug testing of pregnant women).
134. See Michael P. Flannery, Court-Ordered Prenatal Intervention: A Final Means to the End of
Gestational Substance Abuse, 30 J. FAM. L. 519, 570 n.278 (1991) (citing prosecutions by Alaska,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming).
135. IraJ. Chasnoff, H.J. Landress & M.E. Barrett, The Prevalence of Ilicit-Drug or Alcohol Use
DuringPregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, lorida, 322 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1202, 1204 (1990) (pointing out that a slightly higher percentage of white women test
positive for drug use than African-American women; nevertheless, African-American women are
9.6 times more likely than white women to be reported for substance abuse during pregnancy).
136. SeeDorothy E. Roberts, PunishingDrugAddicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality,
and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1433-36 (1991) (arguing African-American
women are easy targets for prenatal substance abuse prosecutions); Dorothy E. Roberts, The
Bias in DrugArrests of Pregnant Women, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1990, atA25 (stating nationwide, mi-
nority women make up about seventy percent of prenatal substance abuse prosecutions); see also
Laurie Rubenstein, Prosecuting Maternal Substance Abusers: An Unjustjied and Ineffective Policy, 9
YALE L. & POLy' REv. 130 (1991) (commenting that many of Florida's prosecutions for drug
abuse during pregnancy have been brought against African-American women).
137. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 281 (1987) (holding that the defendant must prove
"the existence of purposeful discrimination" in equal protection claims with "dear proof" be-
fore the Court will infer an abuse of discretion).
138. More detailed discussions regarding faled constitutional challenges to selective prose-
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ties' confidence in the criminal justice system has plummeted.'
Some in minority communities perceive rebellion against the unjust
system as the only viable option because the justice system fails to
provide the proper tools to dismantle its discriminatory structure. "'
Changes to the sentencing laws providing for uniform punishment
may help to alleviate this perception and restore confidence in the
criminal justice system.
c. Adverse Effect on Women in General
In general, the criminal justice system is incarcerating more
women than ever before."' Furthermore, the length of sentences
that inmates serve is increasing.'4 One reason for this increase is the
removal of discretion from judges under the current reforms. Prior
to these reforms, many believed that women received preferential
treatment in sentencing, based either to notions of paternalism to-
ward women, paternalism toward dependents of women, or to the
idea that judges perceived women as less violent than male offend-
ers. 1s The new reforms, however, attempt to eradicate such
subjectivity under most of the current determinate sentencing laws;
only criminal conduct and criminal history may be considered.'
This change presents a problem to women, evident when looking at
the federal sentencing policies.
In determining sentences, the Federal Guidelines do not consider
pregnancy, family responsibilities, or the different recidivism rates be-
cutions are available. Se4 e.g., Laura A. Wytsma, Comment, Punishment for 'Just Us' -A Constitu-
tional Analysis of the Crack Cocaine Sentencing Statutes, 3 GEO. MASON INDEPENDENT L. REV. 473,
484-99 (1995) (addressing claims under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
Eighth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection
component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause).
139. Butler, supra note 65, at 699 (citing a recent USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll that showed
"sixty-six percent of blacks believe that the criminal justice system is racist and only thirty-two
percent believe it is not racist").
140. See Butler, supra note 65, at 708.
141. TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WOMEN IN PRISON 3 (1994) [hereinafter
WOMEN IN PRISON] (stating that "the number of women sentenced for a violent offense rose
from 8,045 to 12,400 during the [1986-1991] period"); see also RITAJ. SIMON & JEAN LANDIS,
Tim CIMEs WOMEN COMMIT, THE PUNISHMENTS THEY RECEVE 78 (1991) (reporting that from
1980-1985, the female incarceration rate increased from 11 per 100,000 to 17 per 100,000).
142. TONRY, supra note 4, at 174.
143. See Ilene H. Nagel &John Hagan, Gender and Crime: Offense Patterns and Criminal Court
Sanctions, in 4 CRIME ANDJuSTICE: AN ANNUAL REvmW OF RESEARCH 91, 129-34 (Michael Tonry
& Norval Morris eds., 1983) (stating that women receive preferential treatment in sentencing,
possibly because of chivalry or paternalistic reasons); Kathleen Daly, RethinkingJudicial Paternal.
ism: Gender, Work-Family Relations, and Sentendng; 3 GENDER & SOC'Y 9, 19-22 (1989) (discussing
the influence that protection of children has on the sentencing of female defendants).
144. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
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tween men and women.ie Some have argued that judges should sen-
tence pregnant female offenders more leniently to avoid harming
children'4 and to promote economic efficiency. Proponents of leni-
ency for pregnant women advance two compelling arguments. First,
children are unable to develop the necessary attachment to the
mother while the mother is in prison. The failure to develop this at-
tachment hinders the child's mental development.147  Second, the
cost of health care for mother and child are passed on to taxpayers
during the mother's incarceration.1' However, not every jurisdiction
has accepted the leniency argument.'49 Opponents of leniency in-
stead opt for equal treatment of pregnant women as compared to
men and non-pregnant women.
They are winning. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have all but
eliminated consideration of family responsibilities.5 ' This elimina-
tion harms women more than men, as women prisoners are more
145. See Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing. Single Moms, Battered Women, and Other Sex-
Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 905,
932 (1993) ("[B]ecause the Guidelines emphasize elimination of disparity, short shrift has been
given to offender characteristics other than the defendant's prior criminal history and role in
the offense.").
146. See generally id. at 948 (suggesting that pregnancy should be consistently factored into
the "departure matrix").
147. JOHN BOWLBY, 3 ATTACHMENT AND Loss: Loss, SADNESS AND DEPRESSION 22, 426-31
(1980) (citing other studies to confirm that the mother to infant attachment is important for
normal mental development).
148. See Susan E. Rippey, Note, Giminalizing Substance AbuseDuring Pregnany, 17 NaV ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIrv. CONFNEMENT 69, 92 (1991) (indicating that the average total cost for giving
birth and neonatal care for infants born to cocaine users was $7,000).
149. United States v. Pozzy, 902 F. 2d 133 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that a defendant's preg-
nancy ordinarily cannot justify reducing a long prison term which the Guidelines would
otherwise require), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943 (1990).
150. See 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 5HI.5-.6 (Law. Co-op. 1997) (stating that employment records,
responsibilities, fhmily and community ties are "not ordinarily relevant in determining whether
a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range"); see United States v. Headley, 923
F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that although the district court had the power to
depart downward when sentencing a mother of five, no court that had considered the issue had
found parenthood to be an extraordinary circumstance justifying such a departure); cf United
States v. Chestna, 962 F.2d 103, 107-08 (1st Cir. 1992) (affirming the district court's denial of
downward departure based on the convict's position as the mother of three young children),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 920 (1992). In the Second and Ninth Circuits, the courts have been some-
what more willing to view a female offender's family responsibilities as a permissible basis for a
downward departure under some circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d
124, 129-31 (2d Cir. 1992) (affirming a downward departure based on extraordinary family cir-
cumstances consisting of the defendant having sole responsibility for raising four young
children); Raeder, supra note 145, at 942-44 (discussing the Second and Ninth Circuits' willing-
ness to grant a downward departure for single-parent mothers and noting one case in which the
Tenth Circuit did so as well). On occasion, male defendants have benefited from such depar-
tures as well. Se&, e.g., United States v. Sclamo, 997 F.2d 970, 972-74 (1st Cir. 1993) (affirming
downward departure for a man who played an important role in the development of an emo-
tionally disturbed child with whom he lived).
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likely to have dependents living with them before incarceration."'
The impact on those dependents should not be marginalized. When
mothers are incarcerated, children are harmed by losing their pri-
mary caretaker 52 and are more likely to be subjected to placement
outside the home. Incarcerated women are almost five times more
likely to lose their children to foster care than are male inmates.'54
These additional facts illuminate the disproportionate harm that
gender neutral reforms cause to incarcerated women and their chil-
dren.
Furthermore, the Guidelines fail to consider the difference be-
tween men and women recidivists. Many statistical studies show that
women are less likely to commit violent crime than men are and are
less likely to be repeat offenders.' 55 However, statistical difference is
151. WOMEN IN PRISON, supra note 141, at 6-7 (noting that 66.6% of female prisoners, but
only 56.1% of male prisoners, had minor children when they entered prison, and that among
the prisoners who had minor children, 71.7% of the women, but only 52.9% of the men, had
lived with those children before entering prison).
152. BOWLay, supra note 147 (stating the loss of the primary caretaker can hinder the nor-
mal mental development of a child).
153. WOMEN IN PRISON, supra note 141, at 6 (finding that among male prisoners who have
minor children, 89.7% report that the children are living with their mother, while only 25.4%
of female prisoners with minor children report that those children are living with their father).
154. WOMEN IN PRISON, supra note 141, at 6 (stating that 10.7% of female inmates, while
only 2.2% of male inmates, have their children placed in a foster home or institutional care).
155. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY80, 94, 104-6 (1994) (concluding, based on empirical data drawn from a longi-
tudinal study of biological, psychological, and sociological predictors of crime, that young men
begin their criminal careers earlier than young women, commit more offenses of greater seri-
ousness, and taper off their criminal careers much later than do women). Similarly, female
offenders released from prison are less likely to commit a subsequent offense and are much less
likely to be returned to prison than are men. SeeAllenJ. Beck, Ph.D. & Bernard E. Shipley, U.S.
DEP'T OFJUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983, at 5 (1989) (finding that while
47.3% of men released from prison in 1983 were convicted again within three years, only 38.7%
of women were convicted again);John F. Wallerstedt, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE-BUREAU OJUSTICE
STATISTICS, RETURNING TO PRISON 4-5 (1984) (finding that out of the five states reporting, Cali-
fornia, Georgia, Massachusetts, New York, and North Carolina, all of the states except
Massachusetts reported that "the proportion of recidivists among males was substantially higher
than for female releasees").
There is some limited evidence to the contrary. In one study of active heroin users,
self-reported crime rates were quite similar for males and females, except for burglary, an of.
fense for which the average male offender committed five times more offenses than the average
female offender. See 1 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS" 25, at 67-68 (Alfred Blum-
stein eds., 1986). On the basis of this data, the authors speculated that large differences in male
and female arrest rates arise primarily from differences in rates of participation in crime, and
that once active, females commit crime at rates similar to those of active males. See id. at 67.
This conclusion may, however, be an artifact of the focus on the population of active heroin
users and appears to differ sharply from the results observed in birth cohort studies that draw
upon a more representative sample of both offenders and the general population. See, e.g., Neil
A. Weiner, Violent Criminal Careers and "Violent Career Criminals .: An Overview of the Research Litera-
ture, in VIOLENT CRIME, VIOLENT CRIMINALS 35,104 (Neil A. Weiner & Marvin E. Wolfgang eds.,
1989) (finding the male rate of recidivism to be approximately three times higher for men than
for women in the 1958 cohort); Denno, supra note 155, at 155 (reporting that males are far
more likely than females to be chronic repeat offenders and that "female [chronic repeat of-
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not a basis for justifying categorical differences in the treatment of
the sexes. 6 Due to sentencing reforms, judges must compare women
with men when determining possible recidivism, though there may
be a real difference in recidivism rates.
Judges used to have discretion to consider the differences between
men and women in sentencing in order to avoid imposing unneces-
sarily long sentences. 157 Unfortunately for women inmates, children
of women inmates, and society, equal treatment has won over treat-
ment taking into account differences to achieve equality.60 A proper
sentencing system would not have uniform punishments for both
sexes, but would have sentences necessary to protect society from
crime and unnecessary expenses. 5 These uniform and gender neu-
tral laws are achieving uniformity in sentencing, but not uniformity in
punishment because these laws disproportionately harm women more
than men.160
3. Costs May Be Too High
a. Societal Costs
In striving for deterrence, a society usually examines its choices in
terms of societal goals. The current sentencing laws suggest that the
limiting principle of punishment has become "if it deters then it is
good." However, "[plunishment of the morally innocent [or not
morally blameworthy] does not reinforce one's sense of identification
as a law-abider, but rather undermines it.'161 Single-minded pursuit
of deterrence will ultimately defeat the paramount goal of law, which
is to liberate rather than to restrain.162 "One-strike-and-you're-out"
fenders) committed fewer and less severe crimes than their male counterparts").
156. See e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down a law that prohibited the
sale of beer to males under the age of 21, but permitted sales to females over the age of 18
based on statistical evidence showing a difference between the sexes).
157. Id. at 210 (deferring to the legislature in redefining the cutoff age for purchasing beer,
so long as it is gender-neutral).
158. See Raeder, supra note 145, at 951-53 (noting that the effects of a woman's incarcera-
tion are often not taken into account by the Guidelines. For example, incarcerated women
must still find child care for their children).
159. See generally Harvey Wallace & Shanda Wedlock, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Gender
Issues: Parental Responsibilities, Pregnancy and Domestic Violence, 2 SAN DIEGoJusTIcEJ. 395 (1994)
(stating that gender, specifically, may not be a consideration in departing from the sentencing
guidelines, but factors including age, education, mental and emotional condition, community
ties, role in the offense and criminal history may be considered).
160. Id. at 395-96 (discussing that differences with the conditions at facilities, the impact on
parental responsibilities, and the health care needs faced solely by women).
161. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANGrION 65-69 (1968).
162. Id. at 65-69.
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laws have been adopted for some serious crimes and some seemingly
not so serious crimes16s In addition, sentences have become so severe
that a person could receive nineteen years for driving a car with crack
cocaine in itM or twenty-five years for stealing a slice of pizza.16 Un-
der such restrictive laws, people will become prisoners of the law as
autonomy becomes conditional upon human perfection. Accord-
ingly, the societal goal of liberation through law is not served by
current determinate sentencing laws.
b. Economic costs
Further, the current sentencing laws exact a high economic cost to
the public.'66 Even if it is accepted that laws such as "Three Strikes"
successfully deter crime, this deterrence comes at a tremendous eco-
nomic cost, 67 and may be in vain.16 New prison construction projects
in 1992 cost this nation's taxpayers approximately $6.8 billion;'69 yet,
despite the new construction of prisons, over sixty percent of the na-
tion's prisons continue to operate beyond capacity. 7° Worse yet,
eighty percent of state prisons are operating under court order due
to overcrowding and treatment considered "cruel and unusual."17'
This is not a situation destined to improve. The costs of housing
163. Jerry Gillam, California Laws '95, LA. TMES,Jan. 2, 1995, at A3 (referring to the newly
enacted "One Strike" rape law in California).
164. Leiby, supra note 57, at Fl, F4 (discussing a crack defendant, with no prior criminal
record, that received nineteen years for crack cocaine distribution).
165. Eric Slater, Pizza Thief Receives Sentence of 25 Years to Life in Prison Crime: Judge Cites Five
Prior Felony Convictions in SentencingJerry Dewayne Williams under 'hree Strikes' Law, LA. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 1995, at 9.
166. RAND STUDY, supra note 30, at 18 (finding that "Three Strikes" will cost Californians
over $25 million over the next 25 years which would require about a $300 per year tax increase
for the average taxpayer).
167. RAND STUDY, supra note 30, at 18. Violent crime, however, fell by 4.6% in states that do
not have three-strikes laws, compared with the 1.7% decline for states that do have those laws.
168. Greg Krikorian, Study Challenges Effect of 3 Strikes Law: Crime Has Fallen More in States
Without New, Tougher Sentencing an Advocacy Group Says, LA. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1997, at A3 (citing a
study by the Washington-basedJustice Policy Institute).
169. John P. Flannery, Governor Allen's No.Parole Plan: A Billion Dollar Wasteland of Prisons, 2
VA. J. Soc. POLLY & L. 379, 385 (1994); EDNA McCONNELL CLARK FOUNDATION, AMERICANS
BEHIND BARS 2 (1993) [hereinafter AMERICANS BEHIND BARS]; see alsoJohn Hanchette, Cost of
Building Prisons Devours State Budgets, GANNETr NEWS SERVICE, June 2, 1993 (available in 1993
W.L. 7313822) (citing statistics from Justice Dept. in 1992).
170. JOHN DOBLE, EDNA MCCONNELL CLARK FOUNDATION, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: THE
PuBLIc's ViEw 31 (1987) (stating that 34 states are under court order to reduce overcrowding
and improve related conditions); see also AMERICANS BEHIND BARS, supra note 169, at 2 (stating
that "[o]n average, state prisons were operating at 31 percent over capacity. The federal system
was 46 percent over capacity.").
171. SeeAMEICANS BEHIND BARS, supra note 169, at 2 (stating that "[alt the beginning of
1993, 40 states, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico were under
court order for overcrowding and/or unconstitutional conditions.").
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prisoners will continue to rise as the median age of prisoners in-
creases.' 72 Upon reflection, the inability of government to properly
house inmates may indicate that the costs exacted by current sentenc-
ing laws are beyond what the public is willing to pay.
IV. ALTERNATE PROPOSALS TO THE REFORMS
America's reformed sentencing schemes have yet to achieve uni-
form punishment. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that determinate
sentencing will disappear.ln Though criticisms abound, the reforms
have shown some benefits. 74 Therefore, corrections must be made in
current sentencing laws. First, discretion could be transferred back
to judges and away from prosecutors by expanding the considerations
used in sentencing, thus permitting judges to depart from sentencing
schemes in certain situations. Second, effective alternatives to incar-
ceration could be used.75 Third, programs could be implemented
and funded to provide inmates with an education, enhancing their
employment opportunities after release, and to provide substance
abuse treatment to inmates. 75
A. Expand Considerations Used in Sentencing
Today, the only legitimate considerations in sentencing laws are
the offender's crime and criminal history.177 However, a prosecutor
may consider many other conditions in deciding to make a motion
for a downward departure178 Unfortunately, in an adversarial system,
the prosecutor may not be in the best position to make such sentenc-
ing judgments. First, a prosecutor's goals may be contrary to the
need for a just sentence. One of the criteria used in determining
promotions within prosecutors' offices is successful prosecutions.' 79
172. ZIMBARDO, supra note 52, at 7.
173. See Richard S. Frase, The Uncertain Future of Sentencing Guidelines, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 1
(1993) (arguing that the guidelines do work and addressing the recent criticisms).
174. See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L. REv.
523, 562 (1993) (including enhancing the integrity of a plea and simplifying and facilitating the
bargaining process).
175. See David C. Levin, CuringAmerica's Addicion to Prisons, 20 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 641, 641-
42 (1993).
176. See id., at 648 (noting that drug and alcohol abuse must be treated as a "public health
problem rather than a social problem").
177. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.a.
178. Se discussion supra Part UI.B.2.a.
179. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Pradice: Can Prosecutors Do
Justice? 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 58 (1991) (stating that "because [a prosecutor's] success is meas-
ured by the conviction rate, [the prosecutor] may be tempted to ignore the rights of
defendants, victims, or the community in order to obtain pleas or guilty verdicts").
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In striving to achieve the maximum number of convictions, a prose-
cutor may lose sight of what constitutes a just sentence. Second, a
prosecutor's decisions are not often subject to public scrutiny. Plea
bargain agreements and other prosecutorial decisions are usually not
reviewable,'80 and are not publicly available. Further, the low level of
diversity in many prosecution offices may lead to bias in prosecu-
tions.18' The low level of diversity prevents the consideration of
alternate perspectives in the prosecutorial decision process.
If there is going to be discretion in sentencing, it must rest in the
hands of the judge rather than the prosecutor. Providing judges with
greater discretion is not contrary to the goals of the criminal justice
system, but rather helps in achieving its goals. First, justice would
best be served by sentencing defendants based on a totality of circum-
stances approach.s This approach includes considerations outside
criminal conduct and criminal history.183 For example, a judge
should consider categories such as education, employment, and fam-
ily obligations to arrive at ajust sentence.'84 Second, it has not been
shown that having a fixed sentence for a particular crime is a greater
deterrent than allowing flexible sentencing.s Moreover, as indicated
earlier, some fixed sentencing schemes may not deter criminal behav-
ior.86 Third, the concern that additional considerations by judges
may favor wealthy individuals is overstated. Most defendants are not
wealthy,187 and continuing judicial discretion already allows for class
and race bias.s Further, judges are under more scrutiny than ever.8 9
180. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and
Conduct with FinancialIncentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 851,862 (1995) (stating that "[s]o long as
the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense, the prose-
cutor is entitled to bring the charge.").
181. See, eg., Krikorian, supra note 168, at A3 (citing information provided by Los Angeles,
San Diego, Orange, San Bernardino, and Sacramento counties that shows 82% of prosecutors
in those counties are white, while 8% are Latino, 5% are African-America, and 4% are Asian).
It should be noted that the bench is not very diverse. See, e.g., ALLIANCE FORJuSTICE, JUDICIAL
SELECrION PROJECt: ANNUAL REPORT (1996) (citing a demographic portrait of the federal judi-
ciary as follows: 75.4% are white, 16.7% are women, 8.5% are African-American, 4.3% are
Hispanic-American, 0.6% are Asian-American, and 0.2% are Native-American).
182. TONRY, supra note 4, at 149-61, 191-95.
183. TONRY, supra note 4, at 149-61, 191-95.
184. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the adverse effect on women of the inability to con-
sider family obligations). See, e.g., Judge Jose A. Cabranes, Address at the Justice Lester W. Roth
Lecture (Oct 17, 1996) (stating that the inability to consider military employment and service
has an adverse effect on minority defendants).
185. TONRY, supra note 4, at 173-80, 195.
186. See supra Part IIL.B.1 (discussing problems of proportionality, nullification, and linger-
ing discretion).
187. TONRY, supra note 4, at 167-70, 195.
188. See supra Part III.B.2.
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Accordingly, it is not as easy for ajudge to make biased rulings as it is
for a prosecutor to make biased prosecutions.
Fourth, most judges already sentence consistently with determinate
sentencing laws, opting for few downward departures and even fewer
upward departures.' Concerns thatjudges will be "soft on crime" or
too harsh on minority defendants are valid. However, judges are sub-
ject to a greater amount of scrutiny and receive more education on
these issues than ever before.' 9' Judges are in the best position to de-
termine the appropriate punishment for a defendant, while
simultaneously protecting society. The judge can protect society
from recidivism and prevent wasted resources in housing a defendant
that is undeserving. Therefore, determinate sentencing laws must be
reduced to recommendations to judges, who may then depart from
such laws upon a sound justification subject to clear error appellate
review, not mandates that effectively take away judicial discretion.
This humane approach to sentencing balances the needs for uni-
form and tough punishment with societal values and economic
efficiency. It provides discretion for unique cases when justice re-
quires a departure, while providing uniform punishment. Under the
scrutiny of appellate review, liberal or biased judges will not have the
discretion to sentence below or above the recommended range with-
out a stated and strongly supported justification. Moreover, judges
will have the discretion to avoid imposing draconian sentences that
are inappropriate and costly to society. Further, this alternative
would aid judges in the most difficult, dreaded, and burdensome part
of the job, of sentencing.'9' The return of judicial discretion to sen-
tencing is gaining support across the country.93 Allowing judges to
use the determinate sentencing guidelines serves the goals of deter-
minate sentencing proponents, and aids in addressing criticisms by
opponents.
189. TONRY, supra note 4, at 171-73,195.
190. ANNUAL REPORT 1994, supra note 91, app. A (citing that there are few downward de-
partures nationwide (27.1% or 10,456), while there are even fewer upward departures
nationwide (1.2% or 451));ToNRY, supra note 4, at 171-73, 195.
191. TONRY, supra note 4, at 171-73, 195.
192. See, e.g., Hatter Interview, supra note 58; see also Cabranes, supra note 184.
193. The Supreme Court of California has already started to move discretion back into the
judge's hands. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court of San Diego, 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996) (allow-
ingjudge's discretion to dismiss prior felonies in "Three Strikes" cases); see also Cabranes, supra
note 184 (proposing the elimination of mandatory sentencing guidelines in favor of either (1)
automatic appellate review of sentencing or (2) nonbinding advisory guidelines).
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B. Utilize Punishments Other Than Incarceration
Other effective means of punishment other than incarceration and
probation are available for nonviolent offenders. First, the United
States has a history of putting offenders to work.94 Today, commu-
nity service orders impose an obligation to work for the community,
either in lieu of imprisonment or as a condition of probation. 9 '
Community service orders are a significant sanction and usually less
expensive than incarceration.J Second, modem technology allows
for the criminal justice system to monitor offenders without incar-
ceration.197 Electronic monitoring is an effective means to punish
offenders without the cost of incarceration.' These intermediate
punishments provide a greater range of sanctions and facilitate a ra-
tional sentencing system.'9 Intermediate punishments are
economically efficient because they provide alternatives to incarcera-
tionY.2  However, current determinate sentencing laws do not allow
intermediate punishments. 20 ' Thus, the current laws must be
changed so judges may utilize intermediate punishments in a way that
is unbiased.
C. Education and Substance Abuse Treatment Programs
Two strong reasons people resort to crime are the lack of educa-
tional opportunities and substance abuse.0 2 Many inmates, after
emerging from prison, are essentially unemployable because they are
uneducated and have a criminal record.23 Approximately ten per-
194. e 4 e.g., BLAKE McKELvEy, AMERICAN PRISONS: A HISTORY OF GOOD INTENTIONS 7-8
(1977) (explaining that throughout American history prisoners have been put to work by
prison officials).
195. e, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION:
INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 150-2 (1990).
196. Id. at 173, 232-37.
197. SeeJeff Potts, American PenalInstitutions and Two Alternative ProposalsforPunishment, 34 S.
TEX. L. REV. 443,491 (1993).
198. Id. at 493.
199. See, e.g., MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 195, at 5-8.
200. See MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 195, at 5-8.
201. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c) (4) (West 1995) (stating
a defendant must be committed to a state prison).
202. Interview with parolees from a California State Institution, in Los Angeles, CA (Aug.
19, 1996) [hereinafter Parolees Interview]. See also Hatter Interview, supra note 58.
203. SeeChi Chi Sileo, Men Forced to March to Different Drummer, Boot Camps Ty to Turn Offend-
ers Around, WASH. TIMES, July 6, 1994, at A9 (stating that most employment programs for
ex-convicts have less than 50% placement rate); BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1992, at 640 (Kathleen Maguire, Ann L.
Pastore, & Timothy J. Flanagan eds., 1993) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE




cent of all inmates are totally illiterate, and almost sixty percent test
below an eighth-grade level.2 4  This is understandable given that
many inner-city youths expect to be incarcerated or dead, rather than
attend college.0  Therefore, little time is devoted to traditional edu-
cation. Moreover, less than nine percent of inmates participate in
basic adult education classes offered by prisons to improve their edu-
cation level . Consequently, when inmates are released without
basic reading and writing skills, they are much less likely to find jobs,
and have a more difficult time integrating into society.
207
Only recently has the federal government acknowledged the need
to educate inmates. The federal government now requires inmates
attend classes until they obtain a high school equivalency degree and
can read at the 12th-grade level .20  However, states such as California
do not require attending these classes unless the inmate is below a
ninth-grade level.2m  Considering the high illiteracy rate for inmates,
standardized educational programs must be required to prepare
them for a law-abiding life outside of prison.
Substance abuse is another reason people resort to crime.210  Of
inmates currently incarcerated, almost one-third had a substance
abuse problem before the offense. 1 More than fifty percent of in-
mates are under the influence of some substance during the
commission of the convicted offense.1 2 Yet, only approximately
twenty percent of those with a history of drug use are currently at-
tending a treatment program in prison.13 The lack of a victory in the
"'war on drugs" is an indicator that substance abuse is a health prob-
lem, not just a criminal problem. Studies have found that for every
dollar spent on treatment and education, approximately five dollars
204. Randy Welch, Doing Time-Education Plays a Role, CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM, Feb.
1988, at 1.
205. SeeJohn A. Powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War The National Purse,
the Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557, 611 (1991) (finding that for
every black male that goes to college, three others will go to prison).
206. SOURCFOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1992, supra note 203, at 640.
207. SeeEmily Herrick, ThePrison Literacy Connection, CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM, Dec. 1991,
at 1, 5.
208. See Federal Prisoners Required to Complete High Schoo4 CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM, Dec.
1990, at 23; SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1992, supra note 203, at 644 (stating
that inmates sentenced to over 120 days must attend educational classes).
209. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1992, supra note 203, at 644.
210. Parolees Interview, supra note 202; see also Hatter Interview, supra note 58.
211. SOUtCEBOOK OF CRrMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1992, supra note 203, at 602 (indicating
daily drug use by inmates in the month before the offense, not including alcohol or tobacco).
212. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1992, supra note 203, at 603 (identifying
substance as illegal drugs or alcohol).
213. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1992, supra note 203, at 646.
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in related welfare costs is saved . 4 Accordingly, the criminal justice
system must do everything within its power to help inmates with sub-
stance abuse.
These two factors contributing to the commission of crime may be
better addressed at the sentencing phase by ajudge. First, sentencing
laws could be structured to permit the judge to sentence the criminal
to a "mandatory" educational or substance abuse program.2 Based
on the results of literacy and drug tests given to offenders, a judge
could determine whether such programs are necessary for each indi-
vidual. Such programs should be uniformly designed and applied
within the judge's jurisdiction. The programs could be designed by
either the legislative or executive branch of government at state and
federal levels. Nevertheless, the programs should be designed to
achieve the goals of literacy and sobriety. As mentioned earlier, the
federal system already requires literacy schooling. Likewise, it should
require substance abuse classes in addition to literacy classes at the
federal and state levels.
Second, sentencing laws could allow for a reduction of an inmate's
total sentence upon completion of an optional educational or sub-
stance abuse program while incarcerated. The reduction could be
calculated by a predetermined percentage, set by either the legislative
or executive branch at both the state and federal levels. Some sen-
tencing schemes allow for a reduction in sentence for taking part in
educational or substance abuse programs,216 but the reduction is lim-
ited.217 When the maximum amount of reductions has been obtained
through other means, the incentive to participate in these optional
programs is removed. If the criminal justice system wants to pre-
vent recidivism, prisoners ought to be encouraged to participate in
these programs. Thus, educational or substance abuse programs
should be excluded from any limitations.
These alternate proposals to current sentencing policies in the
United States would help eliminate bias in sentencing, ease the bur-
den on the criminal justice system, and help reduce the causes of
214. See, e.g., ABA PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN
AND THEIR FAMIIES, AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL ACTION 27
(1993) (recommending the establishment of unified family courts in all states).
215. In this instance, mandatory is meant to mean mandatory attendance of classes while
incarcerated. Completion of such a program would not be a condition of release.
216. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 2933(a) (West 1995) (permitting a prisoner to receive
work-time credits for performance in work assignments or educational programs).
217. See, e.g., RAND STUDY, supra note 30 (citing state and federal statutes that require a large
portion of an offender's sentence be served).
218. SeeRAND STUDY, supra note 30 (stating that there is a maximum amount of 54 days per
year for good time in the federal system).
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crime. Most important, these alternate proposals are consistent with
societal goals and are more economically efficient than incarceration
alone.
V. CONCLUSION
Discretion in sentencing is a necessary evil. No magic formula ex-
ists for sentencing criminals that can account for all situations and
circumstances. The best that lawmakers can do is to place discretion
in the hands of the most neutral party in any particular case. Of the
three players in a case-the prosecutor, the defense attorney, and the
judge-usually the least self-interested party is the judge. However,
whenever there is discretion in sentencing, individual sentences can
never be uniform or unbiased. Such bias will continue to exist as
long as diverse perspectives are lacking at the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of government. Government needs to consider
perspectives that recognize, and prevent enactment of and the en-
forcement of laws with adverse effects on politically vulnerable
groups.
The sentencing reforms have failed to avoid unfairness and harsh-
ness to women. In striving for equality, the reforms have actually
crushed equality. In some instances, women have been the subject of
selective prosecution. 9 Women are receiving longer sentences than
ever before in the name of equal treatment. However, in areas where
different treatment may be warranted between the sexes, women are
not permitted to receive different treatment.
The sentencing reforms began by liberals and conservatives with
the noblest of intentions, but the current laws have flaws. Uniform
punishment does not exist, and the current laws call for imposition of
draconian sentences in the name of deterrence. The discrimination
that the reforms were designed to eradicate continues to exist, and in
some instances has gotten worse. The status quo must not be de-
fended when it is ineffective. These indeterminate sentencing laws
are ineffective at achieving the goals of the reformers and must
change. A step in the right direction would be to restore judicial dis-
cretion to sentencing, so that punishments other than incarceration
are utilized, and that mandatory rehabilitation programs, such as
prison education and substance abuse programs, are implemented.
The sooner new sentencing options for the criminal justice system
are sought, the sooner solutions will be found.
219. See supra Part III.B.2.c.
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